A Critique of Ambassador Matlock's Views on the Current Russia-Ukraine Crisis

 A long version of Ambassador Matlock's article was circulated in the Moscow Fire Group a few days ago (see Appendix at the bottom of this message).  I had some serious concerns about the article, and responded in that forum.  Since I won’t be able to attend the next Russia and Near Abroad lunch, here is a copy of what I wrote, should any group members be interested.

 1.  I have read Ambassador Matlock’s analysis of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and while I do agree with a number of his points, I am saddened by his apparent descent into conspiracy theory to explain the current situation. I quote:

 “I cannot dismiss the suspicion that we are witnessing an elaborate charade, grossly magnified by prominent elements of the American media, to serve a domestic political end. Facing rising inflation, the ravages of Omicron, blame (for the most part unfair) for the withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus the failure to get the full support of his own party for the Build Back Better legislation, the Biden administration is staggering under sagging approval ratings just as it gears up for this year’s congressional elections. Since clear “victories” on the domestic woes seem increasingly unlikely, why not fabricate one by posing as if he prevented the invasion of Ukraine by “standing up to Vladimir Putin”?”

 -- In other words, the Biden administration is “wagging the dog.” Where have I heard this before? It’s a central line of Russian disinformation. Unfortunately, much of Ambassador Matlock’s additional thoughts appear to reflect this mindset as well. From my contacts with people who are working on this issue in Washington, promoting a conspiracy theory like this serves Russian interests and could not be further from the truth.

 2.  Regrettably, Ambassador Matlock also mentions the 1991 “Chicken Kiev” speech by President George H.W. Bush, which cautions Ukraine and other Soviet Republics against “suicidal nationalism.” This speech was a not-so-subtle call to keep the Soviet Union intact, and may provide a clue to Ambassador Matlock’s current views about the New Independent States and whether they should remain independent, or be re-integrated into a reincarnation of the Soviet Union. Whatever the case may be, for its time, this speech proved to be remarkably oblivious to the political currents that were dominating every area of the USSR outside the narrow confines of Moscow.

 3.  In his section “Was the crisis avoidable?” Ambassador Matlock buys into the current Russian disinformation line that the current crisis is all about NATO expansion. This is not correct.

 -- The supposed danger of NATO expansion is Putin’s cover story for his ongoing campaign to regain the territories Russia lost in 1991. NATO expansion does not threaten Russia. The last time countries bordering Russia joined NATO was in 2004 – 18 years ago (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia). These countries pose no threat to Russia, but Russia still threatens them. Ukraine’s and Georgia’s chances to join NATO are, for obvious reasons, vanishingly small.

 4.  In his section “The most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War,” Ambassador Matlock argues that “The first President Bush also assured Gorbachev during their meeting on Malta in December, 1989, that if the countries of Eastern Europe were allowed to choose their future orientation by democratic processes, the United States would not take advantage of that process.” It is true that many vague assurances were given in the 1989-91 time frame, when German unification was the paramount goal, the Warsaw Pact still existed, and few even considered that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a serious possibility. The world changed completely when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact fell apart. This was a new reality that required new policies – unless you are in favor of resurrecting the Soviet Union.

 5.  I agree with many of Ambassador Matlock’s statements in the section “Willfully precipitated?” The George W. Bush administration took many unilateral actions that were extremely unwise and ultimately self-defeating, including unilateral withdrawal from arms control treaties and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was based on false intelligence.

 -- These were serious irritants in the relationship, but Ambassador Matlock ignores or mischaracterizes many of the events that actually set Putin on his current course, in particular: the Orange Revolution of 2004-5 and the Revolution of Dignity 2013-14.

 -- By 2004, Putin had consolidated his power and created a kleptocratic KGB state that was his to rule. The chief threat to Putin was not NATO, but democratic revolutions that could first overturn his satraps in the countries of the former Soviet Union and then his own regime. Kyiv’s successful Orange Revolution against a Putin surrogate, Viktor Yanukovych, who briefly became President in a fixed election, struck deep fear into the Kremlin, a fear only amplified by spontaneous demonstrations in Moscow against fixed Duma elections (the “Snow Revolution” 2011-13). Two years later, Kyiv’s Revolution of Dignity, which ousted Yanukovych once again, was the trigger for a Russian invasion of Ukraine which ended in the annexation of Crimea and the creation of a “frozen conflict” in the Donbas that Putin has used to create instability in the rest of Ukraine.

 -- Democracy had everything to do with Putin’s aggression against Ukraine. NATO had little to do with it. In 2014, only 13% of Ukrainians even wanted to join NATO.  Ukraine was officially neutral, and its security and territorial integrity were guaranteed by the United States and Russia under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Putin violated this undertaking without a thought when he felt his own financial and political security was at stake.

 -- Ambassador Matlock’s description of the American role in the Revolution of Dignity tracks closely with Russian disinformation and is almost completely false. He also ignores crucial facts. In his version: “So far as Ukraine is concerned, U.S. intrusion into its domestic politics was deep—to the point of seeming to select a prime minister. It also, in effect, supported an illegal coup d’etat that changed the Ukrainian government in 2014, a procedure not normally considered consistent with the rule of law or democratic governance. The violence that still simmers in Ukraine started in the “pro-Western” west, not in the Donbas where it was a reaction to what was viewed as the threat of violence against Ukrainians who are ethnic Russian.”

 -- In accepting the Russian version that Yanukovych was toppled in a coup, Ambassador Matlock leaves out the fact that the Revolution of Dignity started as a massive protest against the incredible corruption and subservience to Moscow of the Yanukovych regime. Ukrainians wanted to join the EU, but when Putin snapped the leash, Yanukovych pulled back, and this is what prompted massive demonstrations on the Maidan. The demonstrators were met with lethal violence. Pro-Yanukovych snipers (SBU personnel marked by yellow armbands) picked off demonstrators on the Maidan, and Berkut regime police also shot many demonstrators. Over a hundred were killed (The Heavenly Hundred). The EU brokered an agreement with Yanukovych and the demonstrators, but Yanukovych fled Kyiv after his Berkut police forces deserted and the Rada voted to remove him from office. Ambassador Matlock also ignores the fact that regular Russian units invaded the Donbas and drove back Ukrainian forces who were on the verge of retaking Donetsk and Luhansk from Russian-supported separatists. Naturally, he also doesn’t mention the downing of MH17 and the loss of 298 lives at the hands of a Russian anti-aircraft battery that had deployed to the Donbas. In other words, he uncritically adopts the Russian propaganda line.

 -- I agree with Ambassador Matlock’s assessment that President Obama did not take Putin sufficiently seriously, but not for the reasons he enumerates. I would have favored Mitt Romney’s policy approach by a mile. Even in 2012, it was clear that Putin and Russia posed a significant threat to US security.

 -- Ambassador Matlock’s characterization of President Trump’s approach toward Putin is even more problematic. It is shallow and completely wrong. As Russian officials and media leaders have noted, Trump was indeed a dupe, and they signified this by their favorite characterization of him: “Trump is ours.” One major theme in current Russian state media is a nostalgic longing for Trump to return as President. He is seen, accurately, as someone who will defer to Putin, who will favor the Russian leader over his own advisers, and who will do what Putin wants without having to be told.

 6.  In his final section, “Easily resolved by the application of common sense?,” Ambassador Matlock argues that it is in our interest to accede to Russian demands, but he mischaracterizes what they are.  He says that Putin is demanding an end to NATO expansion and approvingly notes that we should not “try to detach Ukraine from Russian influence” (with that thought in mind, he would be well-advised never to visit Ukraine).

 -- Ambassador Matlock neglects to list all of Putin’s demands (the proposed treaty has eight points, almost all complete non-starters). They include a ban on Ukraine or any other new nation entering NATO and limits on the deployment of troops and weapons to NATO’s eastern flank, in effect returning NATO forces to where they were stationed in 1997, as well as subjecting NATO military drills and movements to a Russian approval process.

 -- Finally, the Russians have also said that ignoring Moscow’s interests would lead to a “military response” similar to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. I find it interesting that Ambassador Matlock uses the Cuban missile crisis as his template to evaluate the current crisis. In every way, his comments reflect a preference for Russian, not American interests. In my view, this is unacceptable.

 

Respectfully submitted,

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Appendix: Matlock Document

TODAY’S CRISIS OVER UKRAINE

An avoidable crisis

            That was predictable,

                        Actually predicted,

                                    Willfully precipitated, but

                                                Easily resolved by the application of common sense

By Jack F. Matlock, Jr.

We are being told each day that war may be imminent in Ukraine. Russian troops, we are told, are massing at Ukraine’s borders and could attack at any time. American citizens are being advised to leave Ukraine and dependents of the American Embassy staff are being evacuated. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian president has advised against panic and made clear that he does not consider a Russian invasion imminent. Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, has denied that he has any intention of invading Ukraine. His demand is that the process of adding new members to NATO cease and that in particular, Russia has assurance that Ukraine and Georgia will never be members. President Biden has refused to give such assurance but made clear his willingness to continue discussing questions of strategic stability in Europe. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government has made clear it has no intention of implementing the agreement reached in 2015 for reuniting the Donbas provinces into Ukraine with a large degree of local autonomy—an agreement with Russia, France and Germany which the United States endorsed.

            Maybe I am wrong—tragically wrong—but I cannot dismiss the suspicion that we are witnessing an elaborate charade, grossly magnified by prominent elements of the American media, to serve a domestic political end. Facing rising inflation, the ravages of Omicron, blame (for the most part unfair) for the withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus the failure to get the full support of his own party for the Build Back Better legislation, the Biden administration is staggering under sagging approval ratings just as it gears up for this year’s congressional elections. Since clear “victories” on the domestic woes seem increasingly unlikely, why not fabricate one by posing as if he prevented the invasion of Ukraine by “standing up to Vladimir Putin”?  Actually, it seems most likely that President Putin’s goals are what he says they are—and as he has been saying since his speech in Munich in 2007. To simplify and paraphrase, I would sum them up as: “Treat us with at least a modicum of respect. We do not threaten you or your allies, why do you refuse us the security you insist for yourself?”

            In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, many observers, ignoring the rapidly unfolding events that marked the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, considered that the end of the Cold War. They were wrong. The Cold War had ended at least two years earlier. It ended by negotiation and was in the interest of all the parties. President George H.W. Bush hoped that Gorbachev would manage to keep most of the twelve non-Baltic republics in a voluntary federation. On August 1, 1991, he made a speech to the Ukrainian parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) in which he endorsed Gorbachev’s plans for a voluntary federation and warned against “suicidal nationalism.” The latter phrase was inspired by Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakurdia’s attacks on minorities in Soviet Georgia. For reasons I will explain elsewhere, they apply to Ukraine today. Bottom line: Despite the prevalent belief, both among the “blob” in the United States, and most of the Russian public, the United States did not support, much less cause the break-up of the Soviet Union. We supported throughout the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and one of the last acts of the Soviet parliament was to legalize their claim to independence. And—by the way—despite frequently voiced fears—Vladimir Putin has never threatened to re-absorb the Baltic countries or to claim any of their territories, though he has criticized some that denied ethnic Russians the full rights of citizenship, a principle that the European Union is pledged to enforce.

.
But, let’s move on to the first of the assertions in the subtitle:

Was the crisis avoidable?

            Well, since President Putin’s major demand is an assurance that NATO will take no further members, and specifically not Ukraine or Georgia, obviously there would have been no basis for the present crisis if there had been no expansion of the alliance following the end of the Cold War, or if the expansion had occurred in harmony with building a security structure in Europe that included Russia.

            Maybe we should look at this question more broadly. How do other countries respond to alien military alliances near their borders?  Since we are talking about American policy, maybe we should pay some attention to the way the United States has reacted to attempts of outsiders to establish alliances with countries nearby. Anybody remember the Monroe Doctrine, a declaration of a sphere of influence that comprised an entire hemisphere? And we meant it! When we learned that Kaiser’s Germany was attempting to enlist Mexico as an ally during the first world war, that was a powerful incentive for the subsequent declaration of war against Germany. Then, of course, in my lifetime, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis—something I remember vividly since I was at the American Embassy in Moscow and translated some of Khrushchev’s messages to Kennedy.  

            Should we look at events like the Cuban Missile Crisis from the standpoint of some of the principles of international law, or from the standpoint of the likely behavior of a country’s leaders if they feel threatened? What did international law at that time say about the employment of nuclear missiles in Cuba? Cuba was a sovereign state and had the right to seek support for its independence from anywhere it chose. It had been threatened by the United States, even an attempt to invade, using anti-Castro Cubans. It asked the Soviet Union for support. Knowing that the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey, a U.S. ally actually bordering on the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, decided to station nuclear missiles in Cuba. How could the U.S. legitimately object if the Soviet Union was deploying weapons similar to those deployed against it?

            Obviously, it was a mistake. A big mistake! (One is reminded of Talleyrand’s remark..”Worse than a crime …”)  International relations, like it or not, are not determined by debating, interpreting and applying the finer points of “international law”—which in any case is not the same as municipal law, the law within countries. Kennedy had to react to remove the threat. The Joint Chiefs recommended taking out the missiles by bombing. Fortunately, Kennedy stopped short of that, declared a blockade and demanded the removal of the missiles.

            At the end of the week of messages back and forth—I translated Khrushchev’s longest—it was agreed that Khrushchev would remove the nuclear missiles from Cuba. What was not announced was that Kennedy also agreed that he would remove the U.S. missiles from Turkey but that this commitment must not be made public.

            We American diplomats in Embassy Moscow were delighted at the outcome, of course. We were not even informed of the agreement regarding missiles in Turkey. We had no idea that we had come close to a nuclear exchange. We knew the U.S. had military superiority in the Caribbean and we would have cheered if the U.S. Air Force had bombed the sites. We were wrong. In later meetings with Soviet diplomats and military officers, we learned that, if the sites had been bombed, the officers on the spot could have launched the missiles without orders from Moscow. We could have lost Miami, and then what? We also did not know that a Soviet submarine came close to launching a nuclear-armed torpedo against the destroyer that was preventing its coming up for air.

            It was a close call. It is quite dangerous to get involved in military confrontations with countries with nuclear weapons. You don’t need an advanced degree in international law to understand that. You need only common sense.

            OK—It was predictable. Was it predicted?

“The most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War”

My words, and my voice was not the only one. In 1997, when the question of adding more members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I was asked to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In my introductory remarks, I made the following statement: “I consider the Administration's recommendation to take new members into NATO at this time misguided. If it should be approved by the United States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War. Far from improving the security of the United States, its Allies, and the nations that wish to enter the Alliance, it could well encourage a chain of events that could produce the most serious security threat to this nation since the Soviet Union collapsed.”

 

               The reason I cited was the presence in the Russian Federation of a nuclear arsenal that, in overall effectiveness, matched if not exceeded that of the United States. Either of our arsenals, if actually used in a hot war, was capable of ending the possibility of civilization on earth, possibly even causing the extinction of the human race and much other life on the planet. Though the United States and the Soviet Union had, as a result of arms control agreements concluded by the Reagan and first Bush administrations, negotiations for further reductions stalled during the Clinton Administration. There was not even an effort to negotiate the removal of short-range nuclear weapons from Europe.

 

               That was not the only reason I cited for including rather than excluding Russia from European security. I explained as follows: “The plan to increase the membership of NATO fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the Cold War, and proceeds in accord with a logic that made sense only during the Cold War. The division of Europe ended before there was any thought of taking new members into NATO. No one is threatening to re-divide Europe. It is therefore absurd to claim, as some have, that it is necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future division of Europe; if NATO is to be the principal instrument for unifying the continent, then logically the only way it can do so is by expanding to include all European countries. But that does not appear to be the aim of the Administration, and even if it is, the way to reach it is not by admitting new members piecemeal.”

 

    Then I added, “All of the purported goals of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of course the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part of Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European institutions. Of course we have a stake in the development of democracy and stable economies there. But membership in NATO is not the only way to achieve these ends. It is not even the best way in the absence of a clear and identifiable security threat.”

 

               In fact, the decision to expand NATO piecemeal was a reversal of American policies that produced the end of the Cold War and the liberation of Eastern Europe. President George H.W. Bush had proclaimed a goal of a “Europe whole and free.” Soviet President Gorbachev had spoken of “our common European home,” had welcomed representatives of East European governments who threw off their Communist rulers and had ordered radical reductions in Soviet military forces by explaining that for one country to be secure, there must be security for all. The first President Bush also assured Gorbachev during their meeting on Malta in December, 1989, that if the countries of Eastern Europe were allowed to choose their future orientation by democratic processes, the United States would not “take advantage” of that process. (Obviously, bringing countries into NATO that were then in the Warsaw Pact would be “taking advantage.”) The following year, Gorbachev was assured, though not in a formal treaty, that if a unified Germany was allowed to remain in NATO, there would be no movement of NATO jurisdiction to the east, “not one inch.”

 

               These comments were made to President Gorbachev before the Soviet Union broke up. Once it did, the Russian Federation had less than half the population of the Soviet Union and a military establishment demoralized and in total disarray. While there was no reason to enlarge NATO after the Soviet Union recognized and respected the independence of the East European countries, there was even less reason to fear the Russian Federation as a threat.

 

              

Willfully precipitated?

 

               Adding countries in Eastern Europe to NATO continued during the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009) but that was not the only thing that stimulated Russian objection. At the same time, the United States began withdrawing from the arms control treaties that had tempered, for a time, an irrational and dangerous arms race and were the foundation agreements for ending the Cold War. The most significant was the decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) which had been the cornerstone treaty for the series of agreements that halted for a time the nuclear arms race. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, President Putin was the first foreign leader to call President Bush and offer support. He was as good as his word by facilitating the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had harbored Osama ben Laden, the Al Qaeda leader who had inspired the attacks. It was clear at that time that Putin aspired to a security partnership with the United States. The jihadist terrorists who were targeting the United States were also targeting Russia. Nevertheless, the U.S. continued its course of ignoring Russian--and also allied--interests by invading Iraq, an act of aggression which was opposed not only by Russia, but also by France and Germany.

 

               As President Putin pulled Russia out of the bankruptcy that took place in the late 1990s, stabilized the economy, paid off Russia’s foreign debts, reduced the activity of organized crime, and even began building a financial nest egg to weather future financial storms, he was subjected to what he perceived as one insult after another to his perception of Russia’s dignity and security. He enumerated them in a speech in Munich in 2007. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded that we didn’t need a new Cold War. Quite true, of course, but neither he, nor his superiors, nor his successors seemed to take Putin’s warning seriously. Then Senator Joseph Biden, during his candidacy for the presidential election in 2008, pledged to “stand up to Vladimir Putin!” Huh? What in the world had Putin done to him or to the United States?[*]  

 

               Although President Barack Obama initially promised policy changes, in fact his government continued to ignore the most serious Russian concerns and redoubled earlier American efforts to detach former Soviet republics from Russian influence and, indeed, to encourage “regime change” in Russia itself. American actions in Syria and Ukraine were seen by the Russian president, and most Russians, as indirect attacks on them.

 

               President Assad of Syria was a brutal dictator but the only effective bulwark against the Islamic state, a movement that had blossomed in Iraq following the U.S. invasion and was spreading into Syria. Military aid to a supposed “democratic opposition” quickly fell into the hands of jihadists allied with the very Al Qaeda that had organized the 9/11 attacks on the United States! But the threat to nearby Russia was much greater since many of the jihadists hailed from areas of the former Soviet Union including Russia itself. Syria is also Russia’s close neighbor; the U.S. was seen strengthening enemies of both the United States and Russia with its misguided attempt to decapitate the Syrian government.

 

               So far as Ukraine is concerned, U.S. intrusion into its domestic politics was deep—to the point of seeming to select a prime minister. It also, in effect, supported an illegal coup d’etat that changed the Ukrainian government in 2014, a procedure not normally considered consistent with the rule of law or democratic governance. The violence that still simmers in Ukraine started in the “pro-Western” west, not in the Donbas where it was a reaction to what was viewed as the threat of violence against Ukrainians who are ethnic Russian.  

 

               During President Obama’s second term, his rhetoric became more personal, joining a rising chorus in the American and British media vilifying the Russian president. Obama spoke of economic sanctions against Russians as “costing” Putin for his “misbehavior” in Ukraine, conveniently forgetting that Putin’s action had been popular in Russia and that Obama’s own predecessor could be credibly accused of being a war criminal. Obama then began to hurl insults at the Russian nation as a whole, with allegations like “Russia makes nothing anybody wants,” conveniently ignoring the fact that the only way we could get American astronauts to the international space station at that time was with Russian rockets and that his government was trying its best to prevent Iran and Turkey from buying Russian anti-aircraft missiles.

 

               I am sure some will say, “What’s the big deal? Reagan called the Soviet Union an evil empire, but then negotiated an end of the Cold War.”  Right! Reagan condemned the Soviet empire of old—and subsequently gave Gorbachev credit for changing it—but he never publicly castigated the Soviet leaders personally. He treated them with personal respect, and as equals, even treating Foreign Minister Gromyko to formal dinners usually reserved for chiefs of state or government. His first words in private meetings was usually something like, “We hold the peace of the world in our hands. We must act responsibly so the world can live in peace.”

 

               Things got worse during the four years of Donald Trump’s tenure. Accused, without evidence, of being a Russian dupe, Trump made sure he embraced every anti-Russian measure that came along, while at the same time flattered Putin as a great leader. Reciprocal expulsions of diplomats, started by the United States in the final days of Obama’s tenure continued in a grim vicious circle that has resulted in a diplomatic presence so emaciated that for months the United States did not have enough staff in Moscow to issue visas for Russians to visit the United States.

 

               As so many of the other recent developments, the mutual strangulation of diplomatic missions reverses one of the proudest achievements of American diplomacy in latter Cold War years when we worked diligently and successfully to open up the closed society of the Soviet Union, to bring down the iron curtain that separated “East” and “West.” We succeeded, with the cooperation of a Soviet leader who understood that his country desperately needed to join the world.

 

               All right, I rest my case that today’s crisis was “willfully precipitated.” But if that is so, how can I say that it can be

 

              

Easily resolved by the application of common sense?

 

               The short answer is because it can be. What President Putin is demanding, an end to NATO expansion and creation of a security structure in Europe that insures Russia’s security along with that of others is eminently reasonable. He is not demanding the exit of any NATO member and he is threatening none. By any pragmatic, common sense standard it is in the interest of the United States to promote peace, not conflict. To try to detach Ukraine from Russian influence—the avowed aim of those who agitated for the “color revolutions”—was a fool’s errand, and a dangerous one. Have we so soon forgotten the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

 

               Now, to say that approving Putin’s demands is in the objective interest of the United States does not mean that it will be easy to do. The leaders of both the Democratic and Republican parties have developed such a Russophobic stance (a story requiring a separate study) that it will take great political skill to navigate the treacherous political waters and achieve a rational outcome.

 

               President Biden has made it clear that the United States will not intervene with its own troops if Russia invades Ukraine. So why move them into Eastern Europe? Just to show hawks in Congress that he is standing firm? For what? Nobody is threatening Poland or Bulgaria except waves of refugees fleeing Syria, Afghanistan and the desiccated areas of the African savannah. So what is the 82^nd Airborne supposed to do?

 

               Well, as I have suggested earlier, maybe this is just an expensive charade. Maybe the subsequent negotiations between the Biden and Putin governments will find a way to meet the Russian concerns. If so, maybe the charade will have served its purpose. And maybe then our members of congress will start dealing with the growing problems we have at home instead of making them worse.

 

               One can dream, can’t one?

 

 

Singer Island, Florida

February 12, 2022

 

              

 

              

 

 

 

              

 

 

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[*] Senator Biden, as ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1997, had approved NATO expansion. Throughout his tenure in the Senate he opposed lifting the trade restrictions imposed by the Jackson-Vanik amendment even though they never should have applied to the Russian Federation. 

The Great Game. November 25, 2021 -- Main Subject: Ukraine

 

Большая игра. Выпуск от 25.11.2021

The Great Game. November 25, 2021

 

Summary: The general thought that Simes, Nikonov and their guests stressed was that Russia had no intention of invading Ukraine, and that politicians in the West and in Ukraine were seeking to create a false impression that such an invasion would take place, largely to support their own sagging popularity. So, they were stirring up crises. Bill Burns and Toria Nuland are mentioned in part two.

[Begin Part One] 

Nikonov observed in his usual tendentious fashion that people in the US were hoping for war, and provoking it.  Otherwise, why was the US carrying out nuclear exercises around Russia? Simes demurred slightly, noting that in the United States, mass media were talking more about the threat posed by Russian maneuvers on Ukraine’s border. Normally, such talk from the US came after there was an incident of some sort (he cited in an elliptical fashion the Soviet shootdown of KAL007 in 1983).

 

Pushkov said that there was a prior example – the Iraq war of 2003.  Saddam Hussein had done “absolutely nothing,” but the US accused him of planning attacks and possessing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. In the UK parliament, people were talking about a chemical or biological attack that could come from Iraq.  But it was complete crap (polnoye vranye). We are being accused of concentrating forces on our own territory, the same as Saddam. The US mass media is not independent. It mainly expresses the opinion of the executive (Biden).  Biden’s popularity has plummeted, as has Kamala Harris’ (Pushkov indicated with some scorn that he didn’t exactly know what she did anyway). So, something has to be done in the foreign policy sphere to compensate. The US doesn’t like two powers: Russia and China. The US is trying to show its leadership over opposing Russia over Ukraine and China over Taiwan.

 

Chesnakov noted that Zelensky’s popularity was also sagging. Something had to be done to boost his rating.  There were reports that on December 1 a state of emergency would be declared. The new Ukrainian Minister of Defense Reznikov has visited the US and is pressing his counterpart to increase military aid, something that has support in Congress. Biden wins if he can create the impression that he has convinced Putin not to attack Ukraine.  This is a part of the Great Game.

Simes commented that neither Washington nor Moscow wanted or needed war, but he cited, with dark humor, Nicholas II’s statement that there would be no war with Japan because he did not want such a war. Simes then introduced Christian Whiton, who was a frequent commenter on Fox News, perhaps the only US news outlet that did not insist that Ukraine was a central interest of the United States.

Whiton responded in English. He said that most on the left and right had adopted a very severe line toward Russia. This was useful to Democrats, but more with regard to China than with Russia. Most Americans don’t want war with Russia. They think the main enemy is China. Neither party has a particularly good idea of how to deal with Russia diplomatically. The mass media has blown the Russia/Ukraine situation out of proportion.

 

[end of part one]

[begin part two]

 

Nikonov asked Yevgeniy Shevchenko whether there was anyone in Kyiv who could serve as a mediator in the current crisis. Shevchenko, whose sympathies are well-known, suggested – apparently in all seriousness -- that Viktor Medvedchuk would be ideal for the job, were he not of course under house arrest for treason. Shevchenko also modestly suggested that he could go to Donetsk (perhaps reprising the behavior in Belarus that got him kicked out of Zelenskiy’s party). The moderators looked a bit nonplussed.

Simes referred back to Putin’s speech to the MFA Collegium on November 18, when he said that Russia did not need a conflict with Ukraine, but that it had deployed forces in view of the crisis situation on the border of Ukraine and around Russia generally to show the West that the “Russian armored train” was in reserve, in case of need. He asked Chesnakov if this statement by Putin showed that talks were not very promising at this point and that the possibility of some kind of military conflict was real.

Chesnakov responded that, first of all, Putin was addressing diplomats, not soldiers, and he was urging them to point out to foreigners the “red lines” that could not be ignored. He was reacting to British naval incidents in the Black Sea and American air deployments around Russia. And he also had in mind current issues such as summit preparations, the Ukraine situation and Minsk II. Chesnakov stressed that in his view Russia had no need for war at this time, as it had many pressing problems to deal with.  But military action might be viewed in Kyiv as important and useful, not just in Donbass but in Crimea as well, and as Ukraine Defense Minister Reznikov said, they were preparing for provocations from the Russian side.

Nikonov quoted from “the most experienced diplomat” Bill Burns’ memoir “The Back Channel,” in which the current Director of the CIA described “not entirely accurately, but candidly” the events around the Georgia conflict in 2008. Burns noted that Saakashvili received different signals from the US, depending on whether he was speaking to the State Department, the Pentagon, or Vice President Cheney’s team [Nikonov is substantially correct. See p. 241 of “The Back Channel”]. He asked Pushkov whether we were not in a similar situation now, where some elements of the USG would try to push Zelenskiy into a conflict with Russia.

Pushkov replied that it’s clear that the Biden administration also has its moderate wing and its extreme wing. There is general agreement that the US must give support to Ukraine in its political battle with Russia, and some favor military support as well for activities on the borders, in Donbass or the Black Sea, and this view is gaining support. Of course, the American public doesn’t want war of any kind, but it will react to events and support – at first – whatever the elite decides to do, as happened in the case of Vietnam, Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, the US is giving signals to Ukraine that if it starts something, the US will support it. That’s what these air exercises around Russia are all about. He didn’t think that America would send troops to Ukraine, but the US would certainly push Ukraine to do something.  Ukrainians, for them, are cannon fodder. Zelenskiy looks at Biden and Stoltenberg with ecstasy. He can hardly restrain himself from falling on his knees and licking their boots. He’s the kind of person who can be easily influenced and might do something out of stupidity. And there are people in the US who want to push Ukraine into war with Russia.

Simes replied that it was clear that the Biden administration did not want to send US troops to Ukraine and had not promised this, but it would do everything else to support Ukraine, including to supply arms. Simes was struck by how Putin was portrayed in such dark terms as an aggressor, but that there was still an assumption that he would sit by idly while Ukraine was being armed against Russia. He asked Whiton if there was in Washington an understanding of Russia’s red lines, not just on NATO membership, but on the US arming Ukraine.

Whiton replied that he didn’t think there was such a general understanding. Such an awareness was confined to the foreign policy establishment and people like Under Secretary Victoria Nuland, who during her time in the Obama administration dictated who could be in the Ukrainian government and who could not. Simes asked if the Biden administration knew that it should be very careful about this.  Whiton replied that they did not. The Summit of Democracies would likely result in new threats against Russia. Nikonov added that the UK had already said it would send troops to Ukraine, as had Canada (“even Sweden,” added Pushkov).

Nikonov then asked Shevchenko a foolish question, to which he gave a series of foolish answers: if Biden ordered Zelenskiy to go to war with Russia, would he do so? The sum and substance of Shevchenko’s rather confusing response was that Zelenskiy was incapable of carrying out such an order, and he was not popular with Ukrainians anyway. Once again, guests and hosts appeared a bit dubious.

Simes asked Pushkov whether he thought the recent statements by President Putin and Defense Minister Shoigu gave cause for optimism that a new dialogue with the West could be opened up.  Pushkov said he thought not – it would be more an exchange of accusations. In general, positions have hardened. The warnings over Russia’s recent destruction of the Tsirkon satellite showed this. The Americans simply aren’t listening. They talk of dialogue, but not in the most important areas for us. Instead, they rehearse a nuclear air attack on our borders (Pushkov seems really hung up about this). All I can say is that Russia will have to demonstrate what these red lines are through action.

Nikonov highlighted the recent meeting between Shoigu and the Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe [where the US “Global Thunder” strategic force exercise was discussed]. Wei stated “In the face of insane deterrence and pressure by the US, China and Russia are in solidarity together, like a great mountain.  Our friendship is unbreakable. Together we will stand against the hegemony of the US, and speak against the fake democratic regime of the US, fake multiculturalism, and new manifestations of the Cold War. Our mutual relations are better than an alliance.” [I gather from this outburst that Wei is not woke].

Nikonov concluded that neither the US nor NATO had the power to deter the Russia-China alliance, and so they were creating problems. Simes did not agree with Nikonov’s analysis. He cited his favorite President Richard Nixon, who once said that “In Washington, people will tell you what you want to hear.  I will tell you what you need to hear.” It’s important for Russians to know that no one wants war, even Zelenskiy. But everyone wants the adversary to make the first concession (“naïve people” interjected Nikonov). We will overcome this, but we have a difficult road ahead.

[end part two]

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Here is the complete program on YouTube:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYp13Hmrgk0

Summary: Украина пытается убедить США в том, что Россия собирается на нее напасть, и просит защиты. Готовы ли американцы воевать за Украину на самом деле и кто из американской администрации играет в опасную игру? Об этом расскажет известный ведущий канала Fox News Кристиан Уайтон — эксклюзивно в «Большой игре».

 

Ukraine is trying to convince the USA that Russia is intending to attack and is asking for help. Are the Americans really ready to fight for Ukraine, and who in the American administration is playing this dangerous game? Fox News host Christian Whiton discusses this question exclusively with “The Great Game.”

 

Гости студии:

Алексей Пушков, председатель комиссии СФ РФ по информационной политике;

Алексей Чеснаков, директор Центра политической конъюнктуры;

Кристиан Уайтон, старший советник Госдепартамента при администрации Джорджа Буша -мл. и Дональда Трампа;

Евгений Шевченко, внефракционный депутат Верховной рады Украины.

 

Hosts: Dmitriy Simes, Vyacheslav Nikonov

Guests: Aleksey Pushkov, Federation Council committee chairman

Aleksey Chesnakov, Director, Center for Current Policy

Christian Whiton, Senior State Department Adviser in the Trump and George W. Bush administrations. [note: Whiton is actually a Fellow at Dmitriy Simes’ Center for the National Interest. He does not appear to have much expertise in Russia/Ukraine questions]

Yevgeniy Shevchenko, Deputy, Ukrainian Rada (formerly part of the “Servant of the People” Party  

Colin Powell 1937-2021

General Colin Powell passed away today.  It is a great loss for the nation, and for the world.  I didn't know him personally, but I knew a great deal about him, and respected him immensely. 

The only time I ever saw him in person was in 1992, at the National War College, where I was a student. He gave the most impressive speech of the year (at the time, he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).  He spoke before the entire faculty and classes of the NWC and ICAF at George C. Marshall Hall, a relatively new facility on the grounds of Fort McNair.  Powell spoke eloquently, and directly.  He didn’t duck questions, and he engaged with everyone in his uniquely charismatic way.  It was obvious that he was extremely popular with the troops, and for good reason.  

In later years, when he became Secretary of State, I knew exactly what to expect, and I was not disappointed.  His very first speech at the State Department, given on the day of his arrival, was attended by thousands of State employees who spontaneously assembled at the C Street entrance to welcome him.  He was one of the few Secretaries in recent history to actually care about his troops and look out for their welfare during his frequent visits to the Hill, and because of this, he won the loyalty of the working stiffs in the Department to a greater degree than anyone since George Shultz.

I may not have known him personally when he was Secretary of State, but in a way, he knew me.  He was reportedly a fan of the E-Grams I did from Vladivostok and Moscow 2001-2002, and once commented favorably on them in a staff meeting. He paid attention.

General Powell will be missed by all who knew him. We all benefited from his wise and humane policies.

 

On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians // Vladimir Putin.

Об историческом единстве русских и украинцев // автор Владимир Владимирович Путин

"The Great Game" Special post-Summit edition: June 16, 2021

 

Summary: "Talks took place between Vladimir Putin and Joseph Biden in Geneva on June 16. First, there was a small group meeting, and then a large group meeting in which the delegations participated. What can be agreed upon when there is no trust? Or is there? Have the two sides stepped back from a dangerous point, or have tensions in relations only increased, as they did following the Putin-Trump meeting in 2018? The first results of the Summit are discussed on “The Great Game.”

Introductory Comment: The general tenor of the discussion among the main guests and moderators on "Bolshaya Igra" was much more optimistic than I had anticipated. This optimism was probably unjustified, but it shows the desire of the commentariat elite, which “The Great Game” represents, for better relations with the US, and their relief that things seemed to go well. Overall, the contrasts between the style of the Moscow pro-Putin media and Washiington pro-Biden media were almost a case of the "blind men and the elephant." Where Moscow media saw a victory for Putin (though not as great as that over Trump at Helsinki), and focused on the set-piece statements of the Putin press conference, but not the gotcha questions from the pro-Biden Washington media and Putin's whataboutism, the pro-Biden Washington media drew the opposite conclusions, hailing the Summit as a victory for Biden. Moscow saw Putin as gaining stature and status, while Washington saw Biden as delivering important messages to Putin for the first time. Both views are true in their own way, but it shows just how far apart the sides really are. End Comment.

Moderator Dmitri Simes began the program by stating that it was obvious that the Summit had achieved positive results, even though they were not particularly large. Federation Council Deputy Chairman Konstantin Kosachev agreed. On the eve of the meeting, there were many dark predictions. It is true that most of the meetings were taken up with an exchange of complaints, but there were also positive results: an agreement to return Ambassadors to their posts, and an agreement to begin a dialogue on strategic stability, as well as cybersecurity, and the Arctic. That was enough for him to conclude that the Summit was productive.

Co-moderator Vyacheslav Nikonov groused that the only source for Russians on the Summit was President Putin, since President Biden had not agreed to take questions from Russian reporters. Putin, did, however, give a positive evaluation of the talks (the big board then played a clip of the press conference in which Putin said there was no hostility and the meetings were constructive -- the Biden press conference had not yet begun).

Konstantin Remchukov, Editor, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, perhaps getting a little carried away, gave very high marks to the Geneva meeting. President Biden had characterized the meeting as between “two great powers,” going against the Obama administration’s evaluation that Russia was a great power only in terms of nuclear arms. Biden refused to demonize Putin, calling him a worthy opponent. Biden seemed to be talking about “peaceful coexistence,” rather than confrontation.

Nikonov noted Putin’s very important statement on strategic stability lauding Biden’s decision to extend New START II (SNV-III). Simes also stressed the importance of an agreement to talk about cybersecurity. Kosachev said that the return of Ambassadors to their posts was a hopeful sign. (the big board played Putin’s statement that MFA and State would meet to discuss problems on the “diplomatic track,” i.e., the current problems with diplomatic staffing). Kosachev noted specifically the problem of diplomatic ceilings and third-country personnel (a US concern) and the “arrest of properties (a Russian concern). (The big board then showed a video of the site where President Biden would soon give his press conference).

Nikonov then referred to the agreement to begin talks about cybersecurity issues, noting that Putin had pointed out that most cyberattacks occurred in the US, and that attacks originating from Russia were small in number (Comment: this is a willful misunderstanding of how cyber attacks work, and how foreigners use US servers to conceal their activities from US intelligence agencies). Putin also pointed out that there was much work to be done on cybersecurity, since Russian complaints had not been answered. Simes called the agreement to begin a dialogue on this issue as an achievement of Russian diplomacy, but conceded that while beginning a dialogue was a great success, the dialogue itself would be very difficult.

Nikonov raised the issue of Ukraine, which was touched on briefly in the Putin press conference. Kosachev commented that the Ukrainians must be disappointed that Biden was not giving them a free ticket into NATO, and that the Minsk process was recognized as valid by the Americans (at least according to Putin and pro-Putin media).

Simes then introduced former State Department official and current Fox News commentator Chris Wighton.  Wighton (speaking in rather loud English dubbed over in Russian), behaved like a good little Quisling. He took only a few seconds to get around to his main point that Putin had gotten more out of the Summit. Biden was at the end of a very busy trip, but he did well too. Before the trip, Biden was saying very aggressive things about Ukraine and cybersecurity retaliation, but it seemed that some red lines had disappeared. The surprising thing was that the Summit did not fall apart. It was bad timing to put it at the end of such a long trip, where Biden would be saying many negative things about Russia. (Comment: Needless to say, my opinion of the quality of Fox commentators is once again confirmed).

“The Great Game” then paused so everyone could watch the first five minutes of President Biden’s press conference, and then cut away for more commentary.

Kosachev complained that American correspondents were less interested in what happened at the talks and more interested in trapping Putin with trick questions (this refers in particular to the question where ABC reporter Rachel Scott asked why all of Putin’s opponents seemed to die or go to prison – what was he afraid of?).

Earlier, Nikonov had advanced the rather astonishing idea that Russia was a more democratic state than the US. After a commercial break, the big board showed Putin’s outrageous “whataboutism” comparison of Russia’s human rights record (being careful not to mention Navalny by name) with the killing of George Floyd (whom he also did not name) and the entirely unrelated January 6 riots. Dmitriy Suslov, Deputy Director at the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, then piled on with the unsurprising opinion that Nikonov was correct and that the US was a much bigger violator of human rights. Guantanamo and CIA secret prisons came up, among other things.

Simes said that he would not be bothered by a continued exchange of contrary opinions between the Americans and Russians on human rights. As with Nixon and Kissinger, these subjects could be segregated from other questions. He noted, however, that Ambassador Michael McFaul had said that the US could walk and chew gum at the same time and take up human rights simultaneously with other questions. Kosachev said he would like to see no linkage, but he didn’t see this happening under Biden. At present, Congress had created a large number of linkages through sanctions (Magnitsky Act, etc.).

The group then listened to the latter part of President Biden’s press conference, where he talked about the importance of China, and the fact that Putin did not want a Cold War. Remchukov commented Biden wanted a meeting with Putin primarily because of concerns about China. No one wanted Russia to add its strength to that of China.

Nikonov concluded with one of his typical propaganda end pieces, noting that the United States continued to battle for global hegemony and was trying to drag its allies into a new Cold War, but that Putin had no illusions, as he said at his press conference, and because of this the world was a little safer today.

https://www.1tv.ru/shows/big-game/vypuski/bolshaya-igra-specialnyy-vypusk-ot-16-06-2021