KAL007,
September 1, 1983.
The day after KAL007 was shot down off Sakhalin , the State Department formed a task force to
deal with the inevitable Consular issues arising from the shootdown. I worked on the task force for over a week,
talking with and consoling relatives of the 269 passengers and crew, many of
whom were Americans. We all suspected
the worst: that the Soviets had cold-bloodedly shot down a civilian airliner in
full knowledge that it was not a spy plane.
Subsequent release of the flight tapes in
1993, after the fall of the Soviet Union, revealed that the Soviet shootdown of
the plane was a paranoid mistake, but in the
immediate aftermath, the continuing denials by Soviet Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, particularly his press conference
on September 9, proclaiming that KAL007 was a spy plane, enraged everyone on
the task force, and we were all looking for ways to retaliate.
One immediate thought that came to mind was to deny
Aeroflot landing privileges in the United States . Aeroflot had previously been threatened with a
suspension of its landing privileges in the U.S. when, in contrast to KAL007, which
made an innocent navigational error, Aeroflot planes actually did divert their flight tracks out
of New York so that they could overfly the U.S. submarine base at Groton,
Connecticut. After several such
incidents, we told them to stop or they would lose their flight privileges
altogether. Aeroflot did stop, but by
then events had overtaken the whole fly/no fly controversy, and a decision to
stop Aeroflot from landing in the U.S was inevitable. The first immediate result was that Foreign
Minister Andrey Gromyko's visit to the UN in
mid-September was cancelled, since he refused to fly on anything but
Aeroflot.
Gromyko Gets Snubbed.
The following year, the Department decided to allow Gromyko's
plane into JFK on an exceptional basis so that he could attend the UNGA. He flew in on September 19, 1984. Unfortunately, it was not the greeting
ceremony that he or the Soviets were expecting.
Primarily for security reasons, his Il-62 was guided to the most remote
area of JFK, so far away that the rest of the airport was out of sight, and it
took almost ten minutes to get there via back roads from the main
terminal. In order to impress upon
Gromyko just how ill-favored he was, it was decided that the U.S. side should greet him on
arrival at an insultingly low level. It
was in that manner, therefore, that I was delegated to be Gromyko's official
airport greeter. Gromyko's Il-62 taxied
up to the parking area and the entire Soviet brass lined up in protocol order
all the way up the landing stairs and a considerable distance out onto the
tarmac. I was there with the FBI and a
couple of USUN officials at the far end of the line. Gromyko stepped out, greeted all his
high-ranking cronies, and began looking around for the highest-ranking
American. He eventually found me at the
end of the line. Looking even more like
a cold fish than usual, and sporting his usual grimace that rapidly turned into
a frown, Gromyko gave me a limp-wristed and somewhat clammy handshake as I welcomed him to the
United States. He never bothered to look me in the eye. Then he and his minions loaded themselves
into the first limousine and trundled off.
My FBI escorts thought it was all very funny, and so did I. I would not see him again until Codel O'Neill visited Moscow the following year. By then, fortunately, US-Soviet relations were changing decisively for the better.
The next day, Janet and I, and about fifty other officials from all over
the world watched as Yeltsin's chief of staff Yuriy Petrov handed over the tapes in a
ceremony at ICAO's modest headquarters building. A
preliminary analysis revealed the tapes to be intact and in good
condition. Later detailed analysis would
reveal that most of our suspicions about the Soviet cover story on KAL007 were
correct. The plane had flown off course
due to an error in setting the autopilot, which had been programmed to fly the
great circle route and not a specific set of waypoints that would allow it to
skirt the Soviet border. At no time were
the pilot and crew aware they were being chased by Soviet fighters.
A few mysteries remained, but the biggest ones were solved, ten years
after the fact.
In late 1992, a few months after I came on board ISCA (the ex-Soviet Desk), I
found myself off to Moscow
again to discuss a familiar subject: KAL007. Despite repeated Soviet claims that they had never
recovered the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Digital Flight Data Recorder from
KAL007, we long suspected that they had, and were covering up the fact because
the “black boxes” would provide a conclusive refutation of the bizarre Soviet
assertion that KAL007 was a spy plane. We
suspected it would also prove conclusively what many already believed, that
KAL007 was shot down in international waters.
With the fall of the Soviet Union and
the advent of the Yeltsin Administration, the logjam on many long-held secrets
began to break, including KAL007. On
October 15, 1992, Yeltsin handed over the black boxes to South Korea . However, the tapes were either absent or
unreadable, and the resulting hue and cry led to a hurried call for
negotiations to turn over the original tapes to ICAO.
Talks to negotiate the handover were held on
December 8-10 at the Osobnyak in Moscow ,
a site I knew well from my last tour in the Soviet Union . The negotiations, which were led on our side
by Jim Collins, and on the Russian side by
Presidential Administration head Yuriy Petrov,
Deputy Defense Minister Kondratyev,
and Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov, dragged on interminably, even
though everyone knew what the ultimate outcome had to be. Around 9pm on December 9, with everyone
getting very tired, Jim left me in charge to work through the final details
with the Russians, as well as with local diplomats representing Korean,
Japanese and other victims of the crash.
The negotiations continued at a snail's pace, with a number of Russian
players from the security services interposing all kinds of frivolous objections. I remember in particular Tatyana
Anodina, a chain-smoking general who represented Aeroflot
-- she was especially hardline.
Fortunately, others, like Interstate Aviation Committee head Rudolf
Teimurazov were anxious to come to an understanding,
and we eventually achieved final agreement at about 4am the next morning. Last minute changes in the document were
viewed with some misgivings by the Japanese and Korean delegations, but as the
changes were not substantive in nature, they decided to go along. The signing ceremony took place that day, and
the handover was scheduled for January 8, 1993 at ICAO headquarters in Paris .
The following month, I flew off to Paris to witness the
handover. Janet
Speck, the desk's civil aviation officer, accompanied me. We were met at Charles de Gaulle airport by
the local FAA Representative, who proceeded to take us on a tour of his
favorite bars and restaurants while complaining incessantly that he was tired
of “being stuck in Paris
for the last nine years.” Janet and I,
who had been stuck for years in considerably less pleasant locales, could
scarcely refrain from bursting out laughing.
The fact was, Paris
was a complete paradise. All my previous
visits there seemed to have taken place during heat waves, with no air conditioning
in the hotels, and fights literally breaking out in the streets. This somewhat cooler and gentler Paris was a definite pleasure
to visit. Our hotel, the Maillot, near
the Arc de Triomphe, was strictly two-star, but quite pleasant as well.
WRT to your second paragraph. I suspect we may have gone to some of the same meetings. I recall attending an IG chaired by Tom Niles that discussed possible retaliatory actions. I guy I had not known before, John Lenczowski, then of the NSC staff, and arguably insane, suggested (out loud) that we shoot down an Aeroflot plane on its way into JFK. My recollection is there was a momentary hush and the discussion moved on.
ReplyDeleteAny respect I may have had for Seymour Hersh BTW, I lost after he wrote his IMHO piece of trash book about KAL-007
1983 was lucky year for the U.S and the U.S.S.R. As recently released PFIAB documents indicate, we avoided nuclear war by a whisker, and it was largely due to the good judgment of the colonels and majors in charge of the missiles.
DeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDelete