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In contrast to the somewhat hysterical
tone adopted by much of the Russian state media toward the United States this
week, Thursday night’s “Great Game” stuck to a much more sober and conciliatory
tone as moderators and guests talked mainly about the upcoming June 16
Biden-Putin Summit and Nord Stream 2. The middle of the hour was consumed by an
aimless discussion of EU politics, which was then followed at the end by a rather short consideration of
the Ryanair hijacking and Lukashenko’s apparent decision to junk his
multi-vector foreign policy in favor of becoming a “Farpost” of Eurasia,
something that had moderator Vyacheslav Nikonov smacking his lips in
anticipation of greater things to come.
Nikonov lead off the hour by summarizing
the agenda of the upcoming Geneva Summit as he saw it: (1) Strategic stability,
against the background of the complete destabilization of the international
system, (2) Arms control, against the background of the end of the Open Skies
Treaty, (3) Ukraine, against the background of an intensifying civil confrontation
in that country, and (4) Belarus, against the background of a major turn in European
politics as Belarus “landed” the Ryanair flight, the EU imposed sanctions, and
Lukashenko talked of becoming a “Farpost” of Eurasia. Over the past three days,
the United States had said nothing bad about Russia, and had refrained from
calling Russia an enemy. He then asked moderator
Dmitri Simes: “Why is this?”
Simes responded with a laugh, “the Summit.” They are now concentrating on ways to prevent the Summit from being disrupted. A decision had been taken to moderate rhetoric, and for this Biden deserved credit. Simes then contrasted the roles played by Trump and Biden in relations with Russia, noting that while both were personally involved in the US-Russian relationship, the Trump administration was often not ready to act and was not motivated by Trump to act, whereas under Biden it was different (there was much to-ing and fro-ing in Simes remarks, but the sense was that Trump was incompetent and Biden wasn’t).
Simes then asked Federation Council
Committee Chairman Aleksey Pushkov if he thought this change in tone would help
lead to some specific results at the Summit. Pushkov replied that Biden did
have an advantage over Trump. Like Nixon
and Reagan, he started from a hardline anti-Soviet/anti-Russian position. He therefore
had an “alibi” that would enable him to neutralize hardline critics. But the fact was that there was little to
agree on at the Summit. For example, it is hard to see what progress could be made
on issues around Ukraine or Syria. On Iran, it was more what the US and Iran
could agree on, not Russia. On sanctions, Biden had said he would not lift them,
so no progress would be likely there.
Simes interrupted to remind that Biden had
waived some Nord Stream 2 sanctions, but Nikonov argued this affected Germany,
not Russia, at which point Biden was shown on the big screen saying that the
sanctions had been waived because NS2 was almost completed anyway and this was
done out of consideration for relations with Europe. Pushkov conceded that
Russia also benefited from the waiving of sanctions, but that 75 major
sanctions remained which were aimed at smothering the Russian economy. Pushkov
went on to say that the “field for agreement” was rather narrow. The main thing
would be whether the climate of the relationship improved as a result of the
Summit. For example, if there could be a relaxation of tensions, if our
Ambassadors returned to their Embassies, if we could agree not to create
problems for our diplomatic missions, if there could be renewed consultations
on Afghanistan, if we could agree on ways to fight global warming, if we could
create a working group on cyber-security, etc. In other words, if we could
place ourselves on a positive course, not one that leads to another crisis like
the Cuban missile crisis.
Nikonov added that no one in Congress
would speak in favor of improving relations (“except for Rand Paul,”
interjected Dmitriy Suslov, Higher School of Economics, “or Tulsi Gabbard,”
added Pushkov, until reminded she was no longer in Congress). Nikonov asked
Suslov if he agreed with Pushkov. Suslov
said his views coincided with those of Pushkov, although he might be a little
more pessimistic. Domestic politics were highly polarized. Republicans had heavily criticized Biden on Nord
Stream 2, for example. The Summit can stabilize and control the relationship,
but probably not improve it. The Biden administration does not want a worsening
of relations with Russia, as its main concern is the “Chinese factor.” The US
is mobilizing its allies against China. Also, in contrast to the Trump
administration, the Biden administration is very much in favor of arms control
and avoiding an arms race with Russia. New strategic stability talks could be
one result of the Summit.
Simes commented that the possibilities for
new talks were much wider than that, because, in contrast to the Trump
administration, under Biden the role of the “spetssluzhb” was much larger.
Professionals would play a greater role than before. Simes sounded much more
optimistic, noting that there might be no progress on sanctions at the Summit,
but reducing the possibility of a new nuclear crisis like the Cuban missile
crisis is hardly unimportant.
Simes then called on one of his deputies
in Washington, Mark Episkopos, a National Security reporter at the National
Interest, to evaluate the situation there. Episkopos said that very few among
the elite in Washington thought it possible that there would be major results
from the Summit, but supporters believed that it would be a symbolic step that
would add predictability and stability to the relationship. There were some
specific subjects, however, for a serious dialogue, including Afghanistan,
North Korea, climate and arms control. Under Trump, Democrats had objected to
the very idea of a Putin-Trump meeting in Helsinki. Now it was Republicans who were criticizing
Biden for meeting with Putin, including Senator Ben Sasse and Ambassador
Michael McFaul (Amb. McFaul will be surprised to learn that he is now a
Republican). Note: Episkopos spoke good Russian, at least for an American. He
did mix up the words “partizanskiy” with “partiyniy,” which caused merriment in
Moscow, but other than that he was fine.
There was little of further interest in the program
until the very end, when the subject finally turned to the Ryanair hijacking. The panelists’ commentary was interesting in
that it covered almost none of the matters that created outrage and concern in
the West, focusing instead on the only good news for Moscow, which was that
Lukashenko appeared to be orienting himself toward the East. In particular,
Nikonov singled out what was most important for him: Lukashenko’s May 26 speech
in which he said that Belarus would look elsewhere for its economic
opportunities if the West did not want it.
Belarus would become the “Farpost” of Eurasia. Suslov commented that the
extreme reaction of the West was caused by despair, because “potentially” it
was losing Belarus. There was no possibility that Lukashenko would orient
himself toward the West, or that there would be a color revolution in Minsk.
All of the panelists, with the exception of Simes, commented on the double
standard adopted by the West. They could
arrest planes, but Belarus couldn’t. Pushkov concluded that Lukashenko’s dubious
and contradictory multi-vector foreign policy had perished, and it was time for
Belarus to recognize that Crimea is a part of the Russian Federation.
https://www.1tv.ru/shows/big-game/vypuski/bolshaya-igra-vypusk-ot-27-05-2021
